Yet, the final crisis of modernity is an epistemological crisis rather than a social crisis. Here we enter into a paradigm of transition. As modernity collapses as an epistemological and cultural project, a range of possible futures for societies is opened up. Celebratory post-modernism is the belief that modern problems have modern solutions. An example of this belief is that the current ecological crisis will only be solved by the continued use of the emancipatory potential of science and technology.
There are various forms of this argument, ranging from those who believe a different form of modernity will provide the necessary solutions, to those who believe that it is with more intensity that modernity will be able to produce the solutions. The most famous proponent of celebratory post-modernism is Habermas, for whom modernity is an incomplete projec t that must be fulfilled.
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As mentioned above, this has not happened. So where does that leave us? Opposition post-modernism is a concept developed by legal theorist Boaventura de Sousa Santos. According to this theory, it is possible and necessary to think of social regulation and emancipation beyond the limits imposed by the paradigm of modernity. Here lies the transitional nature of our time.
The paradigm of modernity may contribute to the solutions we look for, but it can never produce them. Therefore, furthering the principles of modernity will not solve these problems.
Rather, we must use alternative epistemologies to find new principles to create new solutions. The failures of modernity to achieve its goals and the imaginative limitation of its epistemological underpinnings have brought us towards a paradigm of transition. Obviously, transitional periods are difficult to define and often contradictory in nature, which leads to a simplistic rejection of its emancipatory potential - this is intellectually negligent to say the least.
Paradigmatic transitions last several decades, often taking more then a century to develop themselves, as was the case for the scientific revolution or the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe. The collapse of modernity as an epistemological and cultural project opens up a range of possible futures for society — and one of these, I want to argue, is Islamic finance. The fact that Islamic finance functions within a paradigm of transition does lead to some difficulty in assessing its legitimacy and its potential for achieving what it claims it can achieve.
However, Islamic finance does not function outside the spatial and temporal modes of modernity. There is not an Islamic world and a separate modern world. Modernity is interconnected with the rest of the world as part of the globalized hegemonic power structure.
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It is necessary that we contextualize and place Islamic finance within the larger political-economic system in order to prevent us from abandoning ship right after we have set sail. For Islamic finance too has its problems. Nevertheless, in the post-financial crisis era we are seeing a renewed interest in Islamic finance from the conventional sector and the global south, which is going beyond trying to merely generate alternative revenue streams. There are serious discussions regarding whether the principles of Islamic finance would be able to sustain a more equal economic and social order.
Methods of reasoning may include induction, prediction, or analogy, among others. In the Organon reasoning is divided primarily into two forms, a rough division which persists into modern times. The basic aim and method of inquiry identified here can be seen as a theme running throughout the next two millennia of reflection on the correct way to seek after knowledge: carefully observe nature and then seek rules or principles which explain or predict its operation.
The Aristotelian corpus provided the framework for a commentary tradition on scientific method independent of the science itself its physics and cosmos.go site
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In analysis, a phenomena was examined to discover its basic explanatory principles; in synthesis, explanations of a phenomena were constructed from first principles. During the Scientific Revolution these various strands of argument, experiment, and reason were forged into a dominant epistemic authority.
The 16 th —18 th centuries were a period of not only dramatic advance in knowledge about the operation of the natural world—advances in mechanical, medical, biological, political, economic explanations—but also of self-awareness of the revolutionary changes taking place, and intense reflection on the source and legitimation of the method by which the advances were made.
The struggle to establish the new authority included methodological moves. The Book of Nature, according to the metaphor of Galileo Galilei — or Francis Bacon — , was written in the language of mathematics, of geometry and number. This motivated an emphasis on mathematical description and mechanical explanation as important aspects of scientific method. Through figures such as Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, a neo-Platonic emphasis on the importance of metaphysical reflection on nature behind appearances, particularly regarding the spiritual as a complement to the purely mechanical, remained an important methodological thread of the Scientific Revolution see the entries on Cambridge platonists ; Boyle ; Henry More ; Galileo.
In Novum Organum , Bacon was critical of the Aristotelian method for proceeding too quickly and leaping from particulars to universals, largely as dictated by the syllogistic form of reasoning which regularly mixed those two types of propositions. Bacon aimed at the invention of new arts, of principles, of designations and directions for works. The community of scientists could then climb, by a careful, gradual and unbroken ascent, to reliable general claims.
Whewell would later criticize Bacon in his System of Logic for paying too little attention to the practices of scientists. It is to Isaac Newton — , however, that historians of science and methodologists have paid the greatest attention, by far. Given the enormous success of his Principia Mathematica and Opticks , this is understandable. This was viewed mainly on the continent as insufficient for proper natural philosophy.
The Regulae counter this objection, re-defining the aims of natural philosophy by re-defining the method natural philosophers should follow. The scientist was not to invent systems but infer explanations from observations, as Bacon had advocated. This would come to be known as inductivism.
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In the century after Newton, significant clarifications of the Newtonian method were made. Colin Maclaurin — , for instance, reconstructed the essential structure of the method as having complementary analysis and synthesis phases, one proceeding away from the phenomena in generalization, the other from the general propositions to derive explanations of new phenomena. The emphasis was often the same, as much on the character of the scientist as on their process, a character which is still commonly assumed. The scientist is humble in the face of nature, not beholden to dogma, obeys only his eyes, and follows the truth wherever it leads.
It was certainly Voltaire — and du Chatelet — who were most influential in propagating the latter vision of the scientist and their craft, with Newton as hero. Scientific method became a revolutionary force of the Enlightenment. See also the entries on Newton , Leibniz , Descartes , Boyle , Hume , enlightenment , as well as Shank for a historical overview. Not all 18 th century reflections on scientific method were so celebratory. Both Hume and Kant influenced the methodological reflections of the next century, such as the debate between Mill and Whewell over the certainty of inductive inferences in science.
The debate between John Stuart Mill — and William Whewell — has become the canonical methodological debate of the 19 th century. Although often characterized as a debate between inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism, the role of the two methods on each side is actually more complex. On the hypothetico-deductive account, scientists work to come up with hypotheses from which true observational consequences can be deduced—hence, hypothetico-deductive. Because Whewell emphasizes both hypotheses and deduction in his account of method, he can be seen as a convenient foil to the inductivism of Mill.
Knowledge is a product of the objective what we see in the world around us and subjective the contributions of our mind to how we perceive and understand what we experience, which he called the Fundamental Ideas.
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Both elements are essential according to Whewell, and he was therefore critical of Kant for too much focus on the subjective, and John Locke — and Mill for too much focus on the senses. An idea can be fundamental even if it is necessary for knowledge only within a given scientific discipline e. This distinguishes fundamental ideas from the forms and categories of intuition of Kant. See Whewell entry. Clarifying fundamental ideas is therefore an essential part of scientific method and scientific progress.
The subjective plays a role through what Whewell calls the Colligation of Facts, a creative act of the scientist, the invention of a theory.
A theory is then confirmed by testing, where more facts are brought under the theory, called the Consilience of Inductions. Whewell felt that this was the method by which the true laws of nature could be discovered: clarification of fundamental concepts, clever invention of explanations, and careful testing.
Down-playing the discovery phase would come to characterize methodology of the early 20 th century see section 3. Mill, in his System of Logic , puts forward instead a narrower view of induction as the essence of scientific method. For Mill, induction is the search first for regularities among events. Among those regularities, some will continue to hold for further observations, eventually gaining the status of laws. One can also look for regularities among the laws discovered in one domain, i. These five methods look for circumstances which are common among the phenomena of interest, those which are absent when the phenomena are, or those for which both vary together.
The methods advocated by Whewell and Mill, in the end, look similar. Both involve induction and generalization to covering laws. They differ dramatically, however, with respect to the necessity of the knowledge arrived at; that is, at the meta-methodological level see the entries on Whewell and Mill entries. The quantum and relativistic revolutions in physics in the early 20 th century had a profound effect on methodology.
The conceptual foundations of both of these physical theories were taken to show the defeasibility of even the most seemingly secure commonsense intuitions about space, time and physical bodies.
Certainty of knowledge about the natural world was therefore recognized as unattainable, and instead a renewed empiricism was sought, which rendered science fallible but at the same time rationally justified. In support of this, analysis of the reasoning of scientists emerged according to which the aspects of scientific method which were of primary importance were the means of testing and confirming of theories. A distinction in methodology was made between the contexts of discovery and of justification.
The distinction could be used as a wedge between, on the one hand the particularities of where and how theories or hypotheses are arrived at and, on the other, the underlying reasoning scientists use whether or not they are aware of it when assessing theories and judging their adequacy on the basis of the available evidence. By and large, for most of the 20 th century, philosophy of science focused on the second context, although philosophers differed on whether to focus on confirmation or refutation as well as on the many details of how confirmation or refutation could or could not be brought about.
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By the mid th century these attempts at defining the method of justification and the context distinction itself came under pressure. During the same period, philosophy of science developed rapidly, and from section 4 this entry will therefore shift from a primarily historical treatment of the scientific method towards a primarily thematic one. Advances in logic and probability held out promise of the possibility of elaborate reconstructions of scientific theories and empirical methods.
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